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Abstract:  
Recent decisions involving environmental disasters, such as the Buncefield refinery 
explosion and the failure of Corby Borough Council to remediate the disused Corby 
steelworks site, have suggested that the orthodox position on public nuisance is no longer 
sustainable.  Instead of conceptualising it as a property tort operating on a larger scale than 
private nuisance, public nuisances may also be seen as a separate, personal rights based tort.  
The flexibility of public nuisance has been apparent over several centuries and this continues 
to make it a useful cause in a civil action involving threats to the life, health and safety of the 
public as well as an environmental offence for egregious crimes.  
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Introduction 
Since time immemorial the boundaries of nuisance have disturbed tidy-minded lawyers and 
jurists. Often, confusion results from the assumption that a public nuisance is merely a larger-
scale form of private nuisance affecting a large (but unquantified) section of the public. On 
the other hand, public nuisance can be seen as an environmental tort (and offence), as the last 
ditch protecting the right not to be adversely affected by the unlawful act or omission whose 
effect was „to endanger the life, health, property, or comfort of the public‟ (Archbold, 2010: 
31-40). This conceptualisation posits a quite separate tort from an unlawful interference in a 
proprietoral right, germane to private nuisance.  
 
The tension between property-based and rights-based forms of public nuisance has been 
brought into focus by a number of important cases, culminating in the Court of Appeal‟s 
decision in respect of the failure of Corby District Council to properly remediate the site of 
the old Corby steelworks.
1
  An important implication of Corby is that it strengthens the 
position of public nuisance as a separate, rights-based tort from private nuisance: one that 
does not depend on the victim having a proprietorial interest in land. Dyson LJ quoted with 
approval the position in the United States, where: „Unlike a private nuisance, a public 
nuisance does not necessarily involve interference with use and enjoyment of land‟.2  He 
added: 
...it does not follow that the right which is interfered with in a public nuisance case is 
properly to be regarded as a right to enjoy property. The essence of the right that is 
protected by the tort of private nuisance is the right to enjoy one's property.... The 
essence of the right that is protected by the crime and tort of public nuisance is the 
right not to be adversely affected by an unlawful act or omission whose effect is to 
endanger the life, safety, health etc of the public.
3
  
 
 For a very long time the seminal work on the boundaries of nuisance has been Professor 
Newark‟s piece published over 60 years ago in the Law Quarterly Review (Newark, 1949).  
                                                             
# Barrister and Senior Lecturer in Property Law, School of Surveying & Planning, Kingston University. 
 
1 Corby Group Litigation v Corby Borough Council [2008] EWCA Civ 463. 
2 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts 2d (1979) chapter 40 para 821B (h). 
3 Corby Group Litigation (n 1 above) at [29]. 
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This article is very appealing to traditional property lawyers, who prefer their hedges neat, 
their boundaries tightly drawn.  Professor Newark‟s position is simple: the proper place for 
nuisance is that it is a tort to land, or one directed against the plaintiff‟s enjoyment of rights 
over land, including interference with an easement or profit (Newark, 1949: 482).  Any 
deviation from this position creates uncertainty and conceptual turmoil amounting to heresy.  
The Court of Appeal in Corby, in turning away from such orthodoxy, rejected Professor 
Newark‟s monistic formulation, finding that public and private nuisance should be seen as 
separate torts protecting different rights.
4
  
 
There is some evidence that straying from orthodoxy produces perplexing and confused 
results, so vindicating Professor Newark‟s anxieties.  For example, a government department 
has managed recently to confuse itself so completely that in its guidance to local authorities 
on implementing the Licensing Act 2003 it proclaims that a public nuisance, such as noise 
emanating from licensed premises, includes: „low-level nuisance perhaps affecting a few 
people living locally‟(DCMS, June 2007: para 2.33). This natter will be considered further 
towards the end of this paper. 
 
Judges who stray beyond the proper boundaries are brought to order 
The prim and proper monistic conception of nuisance becomes adulterated once the idea is 
admitted that personal injuries could be compensated in an action for public nuisance. The 
basic proposition placed before the Court of Appeal as a preliminary issue in the Corby 
litigation by the defendant local authority was that compensation for personal injuries should 
not be available to the victims of a public nuisance.
5
  In the final action heard in the High 
Court, Corby District Council were found liable in negligence, for breach of statutory duty 
and in public nuisance.
6
  The local authority were held responsible for birth defects caused 
from the exposure of 18 mothers to toxic chemicals released because of the inadequate 
remediation of the old Corby steelworks which they had supervised.  
 
The earlier, Court of Appeal decision in Corby had been on a preliminary issue about whether 
the import of two recent House of Lords decisions in Canary Wharf
7
 and Transco
8
 was such 
that earlier cases awarding compensation for personal injuries in public nuisance had been 
wrongly decided.  But the overarching authority employed by the local authority in Corby at 
the Court of Appeal was none other than Professor Newark, or rather, his venerable text.  So 
the question arises of whether The Boundaries of Nuisance truly deserves the sacerdotal 
qualities heaped upon it? 
 
Professor Newark places the blame for setting „the law of nuisance on the wrong track‟ on  
Mr Justice Fitzherbert, for it was he who „sent subsequent generations wrong in their law‟ in 
deciding that an action could be maintained for damages for personal injuries caused by an 
obstruction to the highway (Newark, 1949: 483-4).  Thus it was his Lordship who, in 1535, 
during the reign of Henry VIII, uttered the words unlinking nuisance as an exclusive tort to 
land and allowing the possibility of claiming an award of special damages for the 
consequences of an obstruction to the highway (Spencer, 1989: 74).  No doubt Fitzherbert CJ 
was doing what all good common law judges do when trying to find a justification for 
providing a remedy to a meritorious claim: he strained the law. 
                                                             
4 Corby Group Litigation (n 1 above) per Dyson LJ at [27-30]. 
5 Ibid at [10]. 
6 Corby Group Litigation v Corby District Council [2009] EWHC 1944 (TCC). 
7 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655. 
8 Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 61; [2004] 2 AC 1. 
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As if a man make a trench across the highway, and I come riding that way by night, 
and I and my horse together fall in the trench so that I have great damage and 
inconvenience in that, I shall have an action against him who made the trench across 
the road because I am more damaged than any other man.
9
 
For Lord Cooke, giving his minority judgement in Canary Wharf, „if this was indeed an 
indiscretion on Fitzherbert‟s part, to rue it now might seem a little late‟.10 Quite so. 
 
Over the centuries, the main focus of nuisance cases has been on incompatible uses of land 
between neighbours.  These cases have primarily been to do with private nuisance: with 
interferences in the use or enjoyment of land. Some have been concerned with physical 
damage to the land; relatively few cases have dealt with public nuisance as their central point. 
The House of Lords in Canary Wharf had little to say about public nuisance. In respect of the 
interference in television signals, Lord Cooke found „no material difference... between public 
and private nuisance‟.11  This is surprising given the proportion of Her Majesty‟s subjects 
who had been materially affected by the dust nuisance and from interference in their 
reception of television signals caused by the construction of the Canary Wharf tower.  But the 
position of the majority of the House of Lords in Canary Wharf represents the high point of 
monistic orthodoxy, in which public nuisance is eschewed as an independent tort and private 
nuisance firmly put in its place as a property-based tort (Kidner, 1998; Wightman, 1998). 
 
Public nuisance in the 21
st
 Century 
Civil actions in private and in public nuisance have been available for a long time. Public 
nuisance is also a crime; an either-way offence for which an unlimited fine and/ or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment are available on conviction in the Crown Court.
12
 
The crime of public nuisance is defined in very broad terms in Archbold (2010: 31-40) as 
follows. 
A person is guilty of a public nuisance (also known as common nuisance), who (a) 
does an act not warranted by law, or (b) omits to discharge a legal duty, if the effect of 
the act or omission is to endanger the life, health, property, or comfort of the public, 
or to obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her 
Majesty's subjects. 
This definition was accepted by Lord Bingham in R v Rimmington as „clear, precise, 
adequately defined and based on a discernible rational principle‟, a definition which applies 
as much to the tort of public nuisance as to the crime.
13
 
 
Civil actions in public and private nuisance are not mutually exclusive. In determining the 
preliminary issues arising from the Buncefield oil storage explosion, the High Court rejected 
a monistic view of nuisance: 
It is accordingly difficult to discern any difficulty in categorizing the incident at 
Buncefield as a public nuisance … A very large number of people were affected. 
Those who had an interest in land suffered private nuisance.  The explosion 
                                                             
9 Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, Mich. pl. 10. 
10 Hunter v Canary Wharf (n 7 above) at 718. 
11 Ibid, at 722. 
12 In one of the most serious public nuisances in modern times, a sentence of 17 years' imprisonment was upheld by the 
Court of Appeal in R v Bourgass [2007] 2 Cr App R (S) 40. The convict had been the prime mover in a conspiracy to 
commit acts of terrorism (but charged as a conspiracy to cause a public nuisance) involving the use of poisons and 
explosives intended to destabilise the community by causing disruption, fear and injury. 
13 R v Rimmington; R v Goldstein [2006] 1 AC 459;  [2005] UKHL 63 at [7, 36]. Lord Bingham‟s speech is a comprehensive 
analysis of the law of public nuisance, and his words on the rationality of the principle have great authority.  
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endangered the health and comfort of the public at large. Subject to establishing a loss 
which was particular, substantial and direct … there is a claim in public nuisance.14 
 
Environmental forms of public nuisance will include those caused by smells, noise, waste 
deposits and water pollution, but there is no exhaustive list for this common law form of 
nuisance.  Examples include: quarry-blasting;
15
 emission of noxious smells from a chicken-
processing factory;
16
 storage of large amounts of inflammable material;
17
 allowing refuse and 
filth to be deposited on vacant land in a densely populated part of London;
18
 holding an all-
night „rave‟ in a field;19 holding noisy events, such as motocross.20 
 
In the civil action of Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd, Denning LJ
21
 decided that the 
basic requirement for a public nuisance is for it to be so: 
widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would not be 
reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a 
stop to it, but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the community at large. 
So if a class of people or a neighbourhood suffer sufficiently from an unreasonable 
interference in their use of land or from physical damage to their property, then a public 
nuisance action could be brought by the local authority. A person could sue those 
responsible
22
 in a relator action brought in the name of the Attorney-General if he can prove 
that he suffered special damage over and above that of the community at large.
23
 
 
A prosecution for public nuisance may be appropriate for egregious environmental crimes.  In 
the major oil pollution incident caused by the grounding of the Sea Empress, the Milford 
Haven Port Authority pleaded guilty in the Crown Court to a strict liability offence under 
section 85(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991. They received a fine of £4 million, reduced 
on appeal to £750,000 by the Court of Appeal.  The conviction was the result of a plea 
bargain in which the Environment Agency dropped the public nuisance charge on the 
indictment in exchange for a guilty plea for the lesser charge. The late Michael Hill QC, who 
prosecuted Milford Haven Port Authority on behalf of the Environment Agency, conceded 
(during a conference held by the United Kingdom Environmental Law Association) several 
years later that dropping the more serious charge may have been a mistake.
24
   
 
                                                             
14 Colour Quest Ltd and Others v Total Downstream UK Plc and Others (Rev 1) [2009] EWHC 540 (Comm) at [434], per 
David Steel J; reversed in part (but not on the public nuisance parts) by Colour Quest Ltd v Total Downstream UK Plc 
[2010] EWCA Civ 180. 
15 A-G v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169. 
16 Shoreham-by-Sea UDC v Dolphin Canadian Proteins (1972) 71 LGR 261. 
17 R v Lister and Biggs (1857) 26 LJMC 196. 
18 A-G v Tod Heatley [1897] 1 Ch 560. 
19 R v Shorrock [1993] 3 All ER 917. In this case the defendant farmer was found guilty of public nuisance for a „rave‟ 
organised by another person but taking place on the farmer‟s land whilst he was elsewhere.  Mr Shorrock was found guilty 
on the basis that he knew or ought to have known that there was a real risk of the event causing a public nuisance. 
20 East Dorset DC v Eaglebeam Ltd [2006] EWHC 2378 (QB). 
21 Per Denning LJ in A-G v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169, at 190–191. The applicability of this passage to criminal 
proceedings in pubic nuisance was doubted by Lord Rodger in R v Rimmington; R v Goldstein  [2005] UKHL 63 at [44]. 
22 The person  responsible could be a local authority, as in the case of Corby Group Litigation v Corby DC [2009] EWHC 
1944 (TCC), where the council was found liable for public nuisance in causing, allowing or permitting the dispersal of 
dangerous or noxious contaminants that resulted in birth defects.  
23 Establishing what comprises special damage is problematic. In the Delphic words of Mr Justice More-Bick, in Jan de Nul 
v NV Royale Belge [2002] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 700 at 715: „In the end the question whether the plaintiff's injury is sufficiently 
“special” and “direct” must depend very much on the facts of the case.‟ 
24 The Crown Court prosecution is reported in Environment Agency v Milford Haven Port Authority And Andrews (The “Sea 
Empress) [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 673. 
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Unlike a person, who can sue only by way of a relator action in the name of the Attorney-
General, a local authority can bring an action in public nuisance in its own name under 
section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972. The local authority may do so where it 
„considers it expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of its 
area‟.  In Railtrack plc v Wandsworth LBC25 the local authority sought an injunction and a 
declaration that the company should be held responsible for the costs of cleaning the 
pavements from the faecal deposits of pigeons roosting in the girders underneath the railway 
bridge of a south London railway station. The council succeeded in obtaining a declaration 
and the court found the company liable in public nuisance for damage caused by the pigeons. 
 
A common element is necessary for a public nuisance to be proven, as distinct from a series 
of nuisances affecting different individuals as separate instances. A common element may be 
present where there is a sufficiently large number of individual private nuisances and where 
the offence affects individual victims simultaneously.  In PYA Quarries Ltd, Romer LJ
26
 
opined:  
Some public nuisances (for example, the pollution of rivers) can often be established 
without the necessity of calling a number of individual complainants as witnesses. In 
general, however, a public nuisance is proved by the cumulative effect which it is 
shown to have had on the people living within its sphere of influence. In other words, 
a normal and legitimate way of proving a public nuisance is to prove a sufficiently 
large collection of private nuisances. 
 
The courts have given no precise guidance as to what might constitute a sufficient number of 
individuals. The Court of Appeal in PYA Quarries Ltd, somewhat quaintly, referred to „a 
class of Her Majesty‟s subjects‟, but did not place a number on the persons needing to be 
affected by the quarrying activity to bring it within the scope of a public nuisance.
27
  Romer 
LJ did say that it was not necessary to prove that every person in the locality of the nuisance 
needed to be affected, adding that for an injunction to be granted in public nuisance a 
„representative cross-section of the class‟ would have to be affected.28 The use of the word 
„representative‟ in this context is curious since it implies a sample; perhaps his Lordship 
meant it to mean a significant proportion of the total number that could be affected by the 
nuisance. 
 
 A series of separate acts affecting individual members of the community would not 
constitute the necessary common element required to establish a public nuisance. In the 
criminal case of R v Rimmington, in which the defendant was accused of distributing hate 
mail to a number of individuals, Lord Rodger found that „a core element of the issue of public 
nuisance is that the defendant‟s act should affect the community, a section of the public, 
rather than simply individuals‟.29 Consequently, the prosecution for a public nuisance failed 
as each of the letters constituted a separate act of vile racism. 
 
There is another, crucial way of distinguishing public from private nuisances besides the 
„common element‟ requirement.  The Court of Appeal in Corby30 rejected the formulation of 
                                                             
25 [2001] EWCA Civ 1236; [2002] QB 756. 
26 A-G v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169, 187. 
27 Ibid, 184. 
28 Ibid. 
29 [2005] UKHL 63 at [47]. After Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655, in which the House of Lords overruled the Court 
of Appeal decision in Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727, it would not be arguable to claim that the sending of race hate 
letters could constitute a private nuisance, since this act would not be a tort against a property right.  
30 Corby Group Litigation v Corby Borough Council [2008] EWCA Civ 463. 
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public nuisance as needing to be based on an interference with rights to enjoy land in favour 
of the right not to be adversely affected by the unlawful act or omission whose effect was to 
endanger the life, health or safety of the public.  The latter formulation is thus akin to a 
personal rather than a proprietorial right. The Court of Appeal‟s decision in Corby relied 
heavily on that of the House of Lords in R v Rimmington and R v Goldstein.
31
 The use of a 
non-proprietorial rights-based formulation in these decisions could be seen to give a new 
lease of life to public nuisance both as a crime and as a tort.  Corby also provides further 
justification for allowing recovery of damages for persons whose health, life and safety have 
been particularly endangered by the unlawful act or omission in question. 
 
The crucial case for distinguishing public nuisance from private nuisance and for defining it 
as a separate, personal rights-based tort sufficiently affecting the public with a common 
element, is the High Court decision in Colour Quest.
32
  Although concerned with preliminary 
issues in the Buncefield litigation, the consideration of public nuisance is given a very full 
treatment which has not been subject to challenge at the Court of Appeal.
33
 In the High Court, 
David Steel J came to the following conclusion: 
No suggestion emerges from the authorities that, where a sufficient body of the public 
has been subjected to the nuisance, the only claim lies in public nuisance and any 
claim in private nuisance is barred or vice versa:  
a) Private nuisance involves interference with someone's private right to enjoy his 
own land. Public nuisance involves the endangering of the health, comfort or property 
of the public. 
b) It follows that a collection of private nuisances can constitute a public nuisance: but 
it does not follow either that in consequence the claim in private nuisance is subsumed 
or that a public nuisance involving interference with health or comfort cannot be 
freestanding.
34
  
 
The basis for his Lordship‟s argument is that public and private nuisances should be seen as 
separate torts, protecting different categories of rights. But where there is a common injury, a 
private nuisance can become a public nuisance. Just before the passage quoted above, his 
Lordship had found that: 
a private owner's right to the enjoyment of his own land is not a right enjoyed by him 
in common with other members of the public, nonetheless any illegitimate 
interference, being the very same interference contemporaneously suffered by other 
members of the public, constitutes a common injury satisfying the public nature of a 
public nuisance.
35
 
Whilst this may be a correct statement of the law, some will find this position defies logic.  
At the very least it is unfortunate to be stuck with such a fuzzy boundary between a private 
and public nuisance. 
 
Noise and the Licensing Act 2003  
Public nuisances can result from the behaviour of crowds.  Even before the Industrial 
Revolution, the owner of premises attracting a motley crowd largely drawn from the „ragged, 
criminal and dangerous classes‟ could be liable in nuisance (Himmelfarb, 1984: ch 15).  In 
Betterton, Holt CJ found that: 
                                                             
31 [2005] UKHL 63. 
32 Colour Quest Ltd and Others v Total Downstream UK Plc and Others (Rev 1) [2009] EWHC 540 (Comm). 
33 Colour Quest Ltd v Total Downstream UK Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 180. 
34 Colour Quest Ltd and Others v Total Downstream UK Plc and Others (Rev 1) [2009] EWHC 540 (Comm) at [432]. 
35 Ibid, at [430]. 
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playhouses are not in their own nature nuisances; but only as they draw together great 
numbers of people and coaches, and sharpers
36
 thither, which prove generally 
inconvenient to the places adjacent.
37
 
In R v Moore, the defendant used his premises for the lawful activity of pigeon-shooting, 
which attracted great crowds.  In finding against him Lord Tenterden opined: 
The defendant asks us to allow him to make a profit to the annoyance of all his 
neighbours; if not, it is said we shall strain the law against him. If a person collects 
together a crowd of people to the annoyance of his neighbours, that is a nuisance for 
which he is answerable.  And this is an old principle.
38
 
 
Such cases illustrate the existence of an established line of authority in which public nuisance 
succeeded as a cause of action to control noise and the associated problems of crowds where 
the problem existed outside the defendant‟s premises.  It was not a requirement that the 
offending activity be confined to what took place within the premises as the problem was 
compounded on the surrounding land. This line of authority fell into abeyance by the end of 
the nineteenth century, but is relevant to the noise implications of crowds in and around 
public houses as this comes within the scope of the Licensing Act 2003. 
 
The Licensing Act 2003 requires licensing authorities to form a judgment about what 
constitutes public nuisance and decide what is necessary to avoid it by attaching conditions to 
premises licences and club premises certificates.
39
  Avoidance of public nuisances – such as 
from noise, light pollution, noxious smells and litter - is therefore a licensing objective. 
Licensing and responsible authorities are also required to assess the impact of the licensable 
activity on persons living and working in the vicinity when coming to conclusions on 
licensing conditions (DCMS, June 2007).
40
   
 
Local authorities and the police are the front-line authorities for making judgements about 
whether a state of affairs might amount to a public nuisance. Unfortunately, neither of these 
entities has much experience in bringing actions in public nuisance.  Local authority 
environmental health departments utilize their statutory powers under section 80 of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990, but these apply in respect of statutory nuisance which 
has its own procedure.  The modern police force is placed in the invidious position of having 
very little (if any) experience or expertise with respect to the prosecution of environmental 
public nuisances.   
 
The problem of controlling public nuisance for regulators is further compounded because 
changes to the licensing system came into effect less than two years before the ban on 
smoking was imposed.  The application of the Health Act 2006 to ban smoking in all 
enclosed work places and public spaces has included pubs, restaurants, members‟ clubs and 
entertainment venues.  It has resulted in increased noise disturbance from nicotine addicts and 
their associates congregating outside premises where licensable activities take place.  
Government advice is that licensing conditions to control a public nuisance cannot be 
imposed where the problem is caused beyond the vicinity of the premises (DCMS, June 
2007: para 2.39).  However, it might be argued that where a disturbance amounts to a public 
                                                             
36 The Oxford English Dictionary defines a „sharper‟ as „a cheat, swindler, rogue; one who lives by his wits and by taking 
advantage of others; esp. a fraudulent gamester‟. Today‟s equivalent might be a merchant banker or a market trader. 
37 Betterton’s Case (1680) Holt 538. 
38 R v Moore (1832) 3 B & Ad 184; 110 ER 68. 
39 Licensing Act 2003, s 4. 
40 Licensable activities includes the provision of regulated entertainment as well as the provision of alcohol.  Schedule 1 to 
the Licensing Act 2003 sets down types of regulated entertainment. 
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nuisance, although manifested beyond the vicinity of the regulated premises, it would not 
have occurred but for the licensable activity taking place on such premises.  There may be 
some grounds for concluding, on the basis of the line of authority from Betterton’s Case,41 
that the scope of liability in public nuisance is wider than the guidance allows.   
 
Advice from government has been supplied munificently. The Department of Culture, Media 
& Sport (DCMS) has tried to smooth the implementation of the Licensing Act 2003 and 
reconcile it with the object of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003. Buried within its copious 
guidance for local authorities is the following advice: 
It is important to remember that the prevention of public nuisance could …include 
low-level nuisance perhaps affecting a few people living locally as well as major 
disturbance affecting the whole community (my emphasis) (DCMS, June 2007: para 
2.33). 
The authors of the guidance fail to show how their advice might be reconciled with A-G v 
PYA Quarries,
42
 and it would appear to be advice given without consideration of any kind of 
case law authority.  It probably reflects policy objectives based on a very loose interpretation 
of the scope of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, or, perhaps, a manful and retrospective 
attempt by the government to try and make the Licensing Act 2003 more effective than 
Parliament had originally intended.
43
   
 
Concluding comments 
When giving judgment in Hunter v Canary Wharf, Lord Cooke commented on the principle 
of „give and take‟ - central to a proprietorial formulation of nuisance but vague – that: 
The principle may not always conduce to tidiness, but tidiness has not had a high 
priority in the history of the common law. What has made the law of nuisance a 
potent instrument of justice throughout the common law world has been largely its 
flexibility and versatility.
44
  
Tension between a property-based and a rights-based conceptualisation of public nuisance 
could be interpreted, therefore, as a feature of  the common law in which logic is subordinate 
to justice.  
 
Perhaps this tension cannot be resolved without recourse to a „shapely code‟ (Radzinowicz, 
1985, para. 6). Some may conclude that the guidance provided to local authorities by the 
DCMS in June 2007 on public nuisance constitutes the kind of error that Professor Newark 
warned us about long ago in The Boundaries of Nuisance (Newark, 1949). The guidance 
appears to suggest that noise amounting to no more that a private nuisance suffered by a few 
residents would be enough to trigger a licensing review or result in the closure of premises, or 
even that a low level interference not amounting to a nuisance in law could do so. This is 
misleading and remains a source of confusion for enforcers, licensees and the public 
generally. It could be that the position taken on public nuisance is a simple mistake 
committed by government advisers having little expertise in nuisance law. The problem with 
this interpretation is that it implies that the large number of individual civil servants consulted 
                                                             
41 (1680) Holt 538. 
42 [1957] 2 QB 169. 
43 The DCMS guidance is inconsistent with that provided by DEFRA, which states, correctly, in its Guidance to Local 
Authorities The Noise Act 1996 as amended by the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 and the Clean Neighbourhoods and 
Environment Act 2005: Guidance to Local Authorities in England (Defra: March 2008), at [143]: „Although “public 
nuisance” is not defined in statute for the purposes of the Licensing Act 2003 or the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, it is 
generally taken by the courts to be a nuisance which affects the public at large where it would not be reasonable to expect an 
individual to take proceedings to resolve the matter…‟   
44
 Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655, 711. 
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beforehand about the precise wording to be used in the guidance would each have had to have 
made the same error.  A policy to make the guidance appear more relevant and enforceable 
that it really could be in controlling the British binge-drinking culture is perhaps a more 
plausible explanation.  
 
But tension in the law of public nuisance would seem to have played a part and subsequent 
case law has not helped to resolve the difficulties.  In a hastily constituted application for 
leave for judicial review of a licensing case concerning the fortunes of The Endurance, a  
public house in Soho, Burton J did not find the guidance defective though invited to do so by 
counsel for the company, who had argued the point fully and effectively. Somewhat lamely, 
his Lordship decided that the guidance „was not unlawful‟.45 In this case the noise generated 
by the licensed premises had been found by the district judge at first instance to be a public 
nuisance, having been „higher on the scale than something that fell within the category of 
simply a private nuisance‟.  Burton J accepted this finding, though without questioning what 
sort of scale the learned district judge had had in mind, and so his comments as regards the 
lawfulness of the guidance were obiter.
46
  Seen in another light, his Lordship may have been 
doing what all good common law judges do: he strained the law to suit the justice of the case.  
Let us hope that Mr Justice Burton does not follow Mr Justice Fitzherbert in being reviled for 
straying beyond the boundaries of nuisance for the next 450 years or so.
47
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